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The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which requires oil refineries to blend ethanol
into domestic fuel supplies, is a market-based policy that implements tradable com-
pliance credits to better equalize compliance costs across firms. I use variation in the
prices of these credits to retrieve reduced-form estimates of how the RFS impacts the
values of refining firms. In addition to fitting bivariate time series models to compliance
credit and firm values, I use unanticipated mid-compliance-year regulatory announce-
ments that changed mandated biofuel blending volumes to identify event study models.
Previous evidence on cost pass-through suggests that the RFS should have little im-
pact on refining firms. In contrast, I find a significant negative oil refinery stock price
response to shocks in RFS compliance credit values. This negative effect is limited to
refining firms with large market capitalizations and integrated downstream operations.
This evidence discredits a widespread critique of the RFS claiming that integrated refin-





Industry Compliance Costs Under the Renewable Fuel Standard:
Evidence from Compliance Credits
Arthur R. Wardle
The Renewable Fuel Standard requires US oil refineries to blend biofuels into do-
mestic transportation fuels. To ensure that compliance costs under this mandate don’t
disproportionately affect any subset of refiners, the regulation includes a compliance
credit program, whereby refiners blending excess biofuels can sell their excess compli-
ance to refiners that do not blend enough. The price of these credits can be interpreted
as the marginal cost of compliance with the mandate. I measure how changes in the
prices of these compliance credits affect the stock prices of oil refining firms. There
are a number of ways one might expect these compliance credits to affect firms. Much
economic research finds that oil refiners are able to pass the costs of RFS compliance to
consumers quite easily, suggesting that changes in the compliance cost should not affect
firms’ value at all. Large refiners tend to claim that the RFS imposes a large cost and
drags down their profits. Perhaps the most interesting claim is that of the “merchant
refiners”—generally small refiners who do not own the infrastructure to blend biofuels
on their own and are thus forced to comply with the mandate completely with compli-
ance credits. They claim that larger refiners are able to hoard the credits and sell them
for windfall profits at the expense of the merchant refiners. My results indicate that
positive shocks in compliance credit prices are associated with stock losses only among
large, non-merchant refiners, and that even this association is small. This discredits the
claims of merchant refiners, but opens a new puzzle: why are large, integrated refiners
the only ones affected? I conclude my paper with a number of potential explanations,
though I am not able to test between them using my data.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), created under the Energy Policy Act of 2005
and greatly expanded by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, mandates
the use of various biofuels in domestic transportation fuel supplies.1 The statute itself
includes volumetric mandates for cellulosic, biomass-based biodiesel, “advanced,” and
total renewable fuels through 2022. Obligated parties (fuel refiners and importers) are
required to submit specified numbers of Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) to
comply with the standard. RINs are created by biorefineries, which link them to barrels
of renewable fuels, and are split from those barrels upon blending. RINs can be traded,
allowing obligated parties to comply with RFS mandates either by blending renewable
fuels themselves or buying excess RINs from other parties. The construction of the RIN
market is functionally equivalent to other market-based environmental regulations, such
as pollution permits.
Because regulated firms can comply with the RFS either by blending additional
biofuels or by buying RINs, the basic fundamental value of a RIN (with some complica-
tions, described later in this paper) is the marginal cost to the refining sector of blending
an additional unit of biofuel.
Even high RIN prices do not necessarily impact the bottom line of obligated parties
if these costs are easy to pass through to consumers and demand for transportation
fuels is inelastic. Indeed, a large literature establishes that refiners are able to fully
(or even more than fully) pass RFS compliance costs onto consumers (Burkhardt, 2016;
Knittel et al., 2017; Pouliot et al., 2017; Li and Stock, 2019; Lade and Bushnell, 2019).
This, however, does not imply that the RFS has no financial impact US oil refiners
whatsoever. Complete pass-through does not replace the profit margins on refined crude
1A complete description of how the RFS works is available in Schnepf and Yacobucci (2013).
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Figure 1.1: Obligated Parties (Oil Refiners) in a Simplified Gasoline Supply Chain
oil that counterfactually would have been sold without the mandate and may impose
infrastructure costs to accommodate ethanol blends, negotiating costs with biorefineries,
and myriad costs of doing business not fully captured in models of cost pass-through.
Knittel and Smith (2015) give a fuller description of ethanol’s impact on oil refining
profitability. The goal of my analysis is to establish how changes in the prices of RFS
compliance credits (RINs) impact the value of the policy’s obligated parties (refiners).
To accomplish this, I implement two different reduced-form methods, which allow me
to avoid imposing any particular causal channel for how the policy might impact firms’
value.
Outside of the academic pass-through literature, some stakeholders in RFS debates
express concerns that larger refiners use the RFS to disadvantage smaller ones. Refiners
in the United States can be split into “merchant” refiners, who do not blend their own
fuel and are generally smaller, and “integrated” refiners, who do. Though refineries are
the parties obligated by the RFS, RINs are not actually separated from biofuels until
they are blended with gasoline. All this can be seen in Figure 1.1, with integrated re-
fineries owning both “Oil Refinery” and “Fuel Blender” assets and merchant refiners
owning only the former. Not owning blending assets leaves merchant refiners in the
position of having to buy RINs on the market rather than being able to generate them
themselves. Merchant refiners and their advocacy organizations often claim that being
unable to generate RINs puts their operations at a competitive disadvantage and allows
integrated refineries to sell excess RINs for windfall profits (see discussion and footnotes
in Environmental Protection Agency, 2017, p. 21-31). The Environmental Protection
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Agency has dismissed such arguments, pointing primarily to economic research on RIN
pass-through in doing so (Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). Research by Bab-
cock et al. (2016) provides a theoretical explanation for why the RFS should not impact
merchant and integrated refiners differentially.
I directly examine the impact of RIN price fluctuations on the stock prices of obli-
gated refineries. First, I fit bivariate time series models for every firm × RIN combina-
tion. Modeling each firm separately allows me to investigate heterogeneity among firms.
While these models provide a picture of how RINs and firm stock prices are associated
over time, they are subject to endogeneity problems—both RINs and refining stocks
are structurally related to commodity prices, fuel demand factors, and other variables.
The intent of this paper is not to identify these structural relationships, and building
them into the model is beyond the scope of this research. Instead, I take advantage of
two large, exogenous shocks to RIN prices to identify a more plausibly causal estimate
of how RIN price changes impact refining stocks. Following Lade et al. (2018), I use
unanticipated regulatory announcements that drastically affected the price of RINs to
identify the impact on every firm in my sample, as well as selected subgroups of firms
guided by multivariate results.
I find that when RIN prices rise, the stock prices of refineries with large market
capitalizations drop with a 3-5 day lag. The effect is statistically significant though
economically small. Medium and small firms, however, exhibit no reaction to RIN price
changes. These results are consistent across both the bivariate time series and event
study analyses. Due to the reduced-form nature of my estimate, I am unable to identify
any particular causal mechanism for these results, but I conclude with a list of potential
hypotheses worth investigating in future research. In any case, my findings discredit
claims that the RFS enables integrated refiners to take advantage of merchant refiners
and raises doubts about the costs of so-called RIN “speculation.”
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Chapter 2
Background on the Renewable Fuel Standard
The Renewable Fuel Standard is a nested mandate, meaning that blending higher-
level biofuels also works to meet the mandate requirements at lower levels. RINs coming
from corn ethanol generate D6 RINs, which can serve to fulfill only the lowest level of the
mandate. Ethanol from more “advanced” sources such as sugarcane generates advanced
ethanol RINs (D5) and constitutes a smaller, nested mandate. RINs from biomass-based
diesel (D4), cellulosic biofuel (D3), or cellulosic diesel (D7) fulfill the mandate in their
own categories, the advanced mandate, and the total mandate simultaneously. This
nested structure is visualized in Figure 2.1.









The nested relationship gives rise to a price hierarchy for RINs, which binds em-
pirically at almost all times (Whistance and Thompson, 2014):
PD6 ≤ PD5 ≤ min{PD4, PD3,D7}
The absence of strictness to that inequality is not merely theoretical. Federal
regulation prevents most consumer fuels (excepting E85 and E15, which contain up to
85% and 15$ ethanol respectively, are available at a limited number of fueling stations,
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and can be used only in certain vehicles) from containing more than 10% ethanol. When
national gasoline stocks are saturated with 10% ethanol, sales of additional ethanol can
occur only through comparatively miniscule E85 and E15 channels. Thus, at mandate
levels beyond 10% of nationwide gasoline sales, refiners must take advantage of the nested
mandate structure and sell additional biodiesel to meet their requirements (Korting
et al., 2019). In those market conditions, D6 prices track closely to D4 prices (Irwin,
2014).
Congress intentionally set statutory RFS volume mandates optimistically high.
To prevent undue financial pressures on the transportation fuels industry, Congress
explicitly allows the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review the statutory
volumetric standards and reduce them if compliance would be infeasible. The EPA
has found it necessary to invoke that power numerous times. The following statement,
released along with a proposed adjustment of the 2014-2016 mandates, illuminates the
EPA’s role in tempering the statutory requirements:
Due to constraints in the fuel market to accommodate increasing volumes
of ethanol, along with limits on the availability of non-ethanol renewable
fuels, the volume targets specified by Congress in the Clean Air Act for
2014, 2015 and 2016 cannot be achieved. However, EPA recognizes that the
statutory volume targets were intended to be ambitious; Congress set targets
that envisioned growth at a pace that far exceeded historical growth rates.
Congress clearly intended the RFS program to incentivize changes that would
be unlikely to occur absent the RFS program. Thus while EPA is proposing
to use the tools provided by Congress to waive the annual volumes below the
statutory levels, we are proposing standards that are directionally consistent
with Congress’ clear goal of increasing renewable fuel production and use
over time (Environmental Protection Agency, 2015).
In reviewing and adjusting the yearly mandates, the EPA issues a proposed rule,
gathers public comments on that proposal, and then issues a final rule. The final rule
is supposed to be complete by November 30 of the preceding year (e.g., 2015’s final
rule should be issued by November 30, 2014). In the lifespan of the RFS, the EPA has
repeatedly missed that deadline (Bracmort, 2015). Final rules are often made partway
through the compliance year and in one case a final rule was set almost a full year after
the compliance year had passed. Research by Lade et al. (2018) demonstrates that such
announcements shock RIN values as well as some commodity markets and biorefinery
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firm values, but no currently published research uses the shocks to identify the RFS’s
impact on the industry it actually regulates.
2.1 Industry Impact
While the RFS mandate’s point of compliance generally rests with refiners, the as-
sociated costs can be pushed up or downstream if the industrial organization of consumer
fuels markets allows it. As mentioned in the introduction, a developed literature dis-
cusses this very question. Most papers characterize the RFS as a subsidy to high-ethanol
fuels and measure how changes in the value of the RIN ’subsidy’ percolate to prices of
E10 and E85 fuels. The general thrust of the literature concludes that pass-through is
complete (or even more than complete) at the wholesale level (Burkhardt, 2016; Knittel
et al., 2017; Lade and Bushnell, 2019), complete for E10 at the retail level (Pouliot
et al., 2017; Lade and Bushnell, 2019; Li and Stock, 2019), and less than complete for
most E85 (Lade and Bushnell, 2019; Li and Stock, 2019). The general interpretation of
these results is that the RFS is irrelevant to the refiner, costly to most consumers, and
beneficial to consumers of high-ethanol fuel and some E85 retailers.
Understanding pass-through does get us most of the way to understanding how
the RFS affects refiners financially, but pass-through is not the only avenue by which
the RFS could impose compliance costs. Costs associated with biofuel procurement and
profit margins on gasoline sales lost to ethanol are just two additional potential ways
the RFS could impose costs on refiners, even with complete pass-through. The methods
undertaken in this paper impose no particular cost channel on examining the RFS’s
impact, instead electing to allow efficient financial markets price these anticipated costs.
Examining stock price responses to variations in RIN prices gives a highly reduced-form
but generalized and unstructured understanding of how the RFS impacts refineries.
I also analyze heterogeneities among refinery responses, rather than taking refin-
ers as a homogeneous group. Existing research on whether the impact of the RFS is
heterogeneous across obligated firms is scant. There are at least a few reasons differ-
ences might exist. For example, firms which own refining capacity in close proximity
to ethanol production may react less negatively to RFS cost hikes. The RIN market is
designed much like pollution permits in market-based environmental policies, so that the
theoretical market equilibrium in RINs should equalize the shadow prices of additional
ethanol blending across firms (Montgomery, 1972). Whether the RIN system effectively
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accomplishes that is an open empirical question. Findings by LaRiviere et al. (2017) in-
dicate that the RFS imposed heavier burdens on retail gasoline consumers distant from
ethanol production centers because ethanol’s physical properties make it more expensive
to transport, but this is further downstream than refining and blending.
I also investigate firm size heterogeneities by asking whether larger firms have an
easier time passing-through or otherwise dealing with RFS costs. Built-in exemptions
for small refiners facing economic hardship seem to indicate that the drafters of the
RFS policy must have worried about differential impacts. Beyond minimizing impacts
on smaller refineries, exemptions can also shift the burden of meeting the volumetric
mandates to larger refineries if they are issued before the final rule (Coppess and Irwin,
2017). Exemptions hit a low point in 2015, with only 7 petitions granted representing
3 billion gallons of gasoline, as compared to 29 petitions granted representing over 13
billion gallons just two years later (Environmental Protection Agency, 2018). Of course,
political connections, easier access to credit, and other factors benefiting large firms may
mean that smaller firms still bear the brunt of the regulation.
Large firms also tend to have integrated downstream operations, allowing them to
blend their own ethanol to generate RINs rather than being required to buy them from
separated downstream blenders. As discussed in the introduction, this is the basis for
a perennial complaint by small refineries, who argue that integrated operations profit
from their ability to generate and sell their excess RINs.
All sorts of heterogeneities in firm operations are of interest to regulatory agencies
because differences in cost structures could counter-intuitively incite lower-cost firms
to support the law as a new, artificial source of comparative advantage (Salop and
Scheffman, 1983). My reduced-form estimates of how firms respond to positive price
changes in RFS compliance costs can lend credence to or discredit some of these theories.
2.2 2015 RIN Shocks
As mentioned previously, the EPA sometimes misses regulatory announcement
deadlines, resulting in major regulatory announcements that occur mid-compliance year.
In 2013, the EPA released the final rule on August 6, leaked a draft proposal for 2014 on
October 11, and released 2014’s official proposed rule on November 15. Lade et al. (2018)
measures how 2013’s mid-year announcements influenced RIN prices themselves, related
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commodity markets, and the stock prices of biorefining firms. They find that those
shocks, which drove the prices of all RIN varieties downward, mainly impacted com-
modities and firms tied to advanced biofuels, which they considered to be the marginal
compliance fuel. The year 2013 was a volatile time for RIN markets, and visual inspec-
tion of RIN price histories throughout 2013 in Figure 2.2 reveals that the announcement
dates analyzed by Lade et al. (2018), while significant, are unremarkable compared to
baseline volatility.



































Unlike 2013, 2015’s proposed and final rules, which were released on May 29 and
November 30, are clearly and unambiguously apparent by visual inspection of Figure
2.3.1 Surrounding a proposed rulemaking on May 29, 2015, the price of a D6 RIN
dropped from $0.69 one week before to $0.3775 one week afterwards, a drop of more
than 45%. A jump of similar magnitude surrounded a final rulemaking on November
30, 2015.
In this study, I focus on 2015 because the EPA made two major policy announce-
ments that I will exploit as structural breaks following Lade et al. (2018). I choose
2015 over 2013, the primary year analyzed by Lade et al. (2018), for two reasons: First,
the announcement breaks are much clearer in the data; that can be seen by comparing
1In an online supplement, Lade et al. (2018) repeat the portion of their analysis detailing how policy
announcements affect RIN prices for 2015 event dates. Unlike their 2013 analysis, they do not examine
how 2015 announcements affected biofuel stocks or commodity markets.
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Figures 2.2 and 2.3, but note the change in the extent of the price axis. Second, RIN
prices are sufficiently high throughout 2015 to guarantee that the mandate was binding,
whereas early 2013 prices were so low that the RFS may not have actually been stringent
enough to alter refiner behavior (Whistance et al., 2016).
2.3 Identification of RFS Industry Impact
This paper employs two methodologies to study the impact of the Renewable Fuel
Standard on the refining industry. First, I use multivariate time series methods to
quantify the response of refining firm values to shocks in RIN price series. In particular,
for every Firm × RIN combination, I estimate impulse response functions using vector
auto-regressions and vector error correction models. These allow me to determine the
dynamic response of the value of refining firms to shocks in the value of RIN prices. This
portion of my analysis builds on past literature using time series methods to unravel
how RINs transmit to wholesale and consumer fuels (Knittel et al., 2017) and biofuel-
related commodities (Whistance and Thompson, 2014; Whistance et al., 2016). Second, I
implement an event study methodology similar to that used by Lade et al. (2018). Even
if endogeneity complicates measurement of direct industry impact using conventional
multivariate time series methods, I anticipate that the large shocks constituting nearly
half of RIN prices should induce measurable impacts on refining firms if indeed there is
an impact. The event study methodology also side-steps nonlinearities in the RIN-stock
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system that may complicate the bivariate models (Serra et al., 2011).
Both methodologies are reduced-form. By examining stock prices rather than spe-
cific product prices, I should be able to identify the impact of any channel whereby a
larger RFS mandate influences the net values of refining firms in the short-run. The
downside of this approach is that I cannot validate any particular channel of causality.
Nevertheless, establishing the existence or non-existence of an effect in and of itself of-
fers insights as to whether cost pass-through is an adequate stopping point for research





As described in the introduction, RINs are compliance credits that refiners obligated
by the RFS can use to meet their biofuel utilization mandates. Because multiple, nested
categories exist within the RFS mandate, there are four commonly traded types of RINs,
as shown in Figure 2.1.
The mandate for D3 RINs is consistently minuscule, and markets for those RINs are
commensurately quite thin. Therefore, I restrict my analysis to D6, D5, and D4 RINs.
RIN series also differ by their year of creation; apart from some flexibility allowing limited
inter-year banking and borrowing of RIN stocks, RINs are mostly used to comply with
the mandate for the year in which they were generated. Thus, I limit my analysis to
RINs of a single compliance year.1 As discussed in Section 2.2, I analyze data from 2015.
Because of some pre-year trading and the fact that RINs are not actually submitted for
compliance until a few months after year end, my data does extend a little beyond a
single calendar year.
All data is daily, excluding weekend and other financial market closures such as
holidays. Data for RIN series come from the Oil Price Information Service (OPIS),
a company that provides pricing for numerous petroleum products and is a frequent
supplier of RIN data for economic researchers. Stock prices for nearly all firms are
adjusted prices from Yahoo! Finance (accessed via the quantmod package in R). Stocks
delisted since 2015 are not available on Yahoo! Finance and are instead sourced from
Bloomberg. While these prices are not adjusted, none of those firms underwent stock
splits or reverse-splits in the study period, so this should be of little consequence.
1The majority of the literature examining RIN prices do not restrict their analyses to a single com-
pliance year. It is not always clear how this literature stitches together price series for RINs belonging




This study encompasses all publicly traded firms with at least 200,000 barrels per
day of refining capacity as of January 1, 2015, plus Western Refining (Energy Information
Administration, 2015). I sort firms along two dimensions: size and exposure to RFS
regulatory costs as of the beginning of 2015. I use market capitalization as a relevant
measure of firm size (Fama and French, 1992) and the percentage of a firm’s refining
capacity in PADD 2 and Alaska as my measure of exposure (or, rather, non-exposure).2
PADDs are collections of states by which many government-issued petroleum data
sources are aggregated. The Midwest, encompassed by PADD 2, contains the vast ma-
jority of ethanol refining capacity because refinery location decisions are driven primarily
by access to feedstocks (Lambert et al., 2008). Because ethanol cannot be transported
using existing pipeline infrastructure, it is plausible to think that the RFS puts refiner-
ies located near biorefineries at a comparative advantage. Geographic disparity in the
impacts of the RFS have already been documented for retail gasoline prices (LaRiviere
et al., 2017) and pass-through of RIN prices by rack sellers at fuel terminals (Pouliot
et al., 2017). Alaskan refining capacity is also included in this measure because Alaska
is exempted from the RFS. I sort firms into one of nine bins, one for each element of
the cross product of three market capitalization and three RFS exposure bins, as shown
in Table 3.1. The cutoffs were chosen somewhat arbitrarily to result in balanced bins,
but, as the next paragraph further explains, the cutoffs do run parallel to important
qualitative differences between firms.
Firms characterized as large (market capitalizations in excess of $100B) are also the
US firms generally considered to be large, integrated refineries: BP, Shell, Chevron, and
ExxonMobil. In mid-2015, an analysis released by Valero Energy Corporation argued
that those firms were already separating RINs in excess of their own RFS obligations,
yielding them “windfall profits,” because their sales of branded gasoline made up large
percentages of their refinery production (Valero Energy Corporation, 2015). Patterns
of price response among these energy firms could lend evidence for or against those
conjectures. The line between small and medium refining firms also separates relatively
smaller nationwide operations from merely regional companies.
2PADD stands for Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts. Using refining capacity in PADDs
2, 3, and Alaska or, inversely, using refining capacity in PADDs 1 and 5 minus Alaska, hardly changes
the groupings.
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Table 3.1: Firm Characteristics with Ticker Symbols
100% Exposed <100% & >70% Exposed <70% Exposed
Large: >$100B
Shell (RDS.A)




< $100B, > $10B Phillips 66 (PSX)
Small: <$10B
Carlyle Group (CG)
Andeavor (ANDV) HollyFrontier (HFC)
Western Refining (WNR)
3.2 Stationarity Tests
Both methods of my analysis require stationary data inputs, so I begin by testing
for stationarity in my data. Tests for stationarity are known to be biased towards conclu-
sions of non-stationarity in the presence of structural breaks (Perron, 1989). However,
despite evidence indicating the presence of structural breaks in RIN price series (Ma-
son and Wilmot, 2016; Lade et al., 2018), no prior research to my knowledge considers
structural breaks in tests of RIN price stationarity, including RFS research specifically
related to large breaks, such as Lade et al. (2018).
Most popular structural break tests allow for endogenous breakpoint selection,
reflecting that most structural break research requires first identifying the exact location
of the breakage. I have no need for that—I know the precise dates of the breaks ex ante—
and running those tests would sacrifice power unnecessarily. Lee and Strazicich (2003)
depart from that norm and offer a stationarity test (hereafter the LS test) that allows
for up to two exogenously defined structural breaks.3
The LS test allows for breaks in both mean and trend, using a vector of structural
break variables for breaks occurring at t = T1 and t = T2: Zt = [DU1,t, DU2,t, DT1,t, DT2,t]
′,
where DUi,t = 1 for t ≥ Ti + 1 and zero otherwise and DTi,t = t− Ti for t ≥ Ti + 1 and
zero otherwise for i = 1, 2. The LS two-break unit root test is estimated by the equation
∆yt = δ
′∆Zt + φS̃t−1 + ut, (3.1)
where yt is the variable whose stationarity is being tested; ∆ is the difference operator;
S̃t = yt− ψ̃x−Ztδ̃ for t ≥ 2; δ̃ are coefficients recovered from a regression of ∆yt on ∆Zt
(i.e., ∆yt = δ
′∆Zt+ et); ψ̃x = y1−Z1δ̃; and ut satisfies the normality conditions defined
3An endogenous version of the same test is also described by Lee and Strazicich (2003) and is the
test most frequently associated with the paper.
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by Phillips and Perron (1988, p. 336). The test statistic for the unit root null hypothesis
is the t-statistic on the parameter estimate for φ, and significance is checked using critical
values for an exogenous 2-break unit root test reported in Lee and Strazicich (2003).4
For testing stationarity of my non-RIN series, the LS test conveniently exhibits
nice size and power properties even when the actual data generating process contains no
breaks. Results of the LS test are reported in Table 3.2 alongside the typical Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests, which do
not account for structural breaks. The three tests conclude unanimously that every RIN
and stock price series is non-stationary.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics and Stationarity Tests
Summary Statistics Stationarity Tests
Mean St. Dev N ADF KPSS LS
Null: Non-stationary Stationary Non-stationary
D6 0.599 0.155 357 -1.557 1.425*** -1.931
D5 0.721 0.119 357 -1.630 1.420*** -1.019
D4 0.759 0.134 357 -1.491 1.777*** -0.255
VLO 53.780 5.633 357 -2.421 3.164*** -1.230
MPC 42.283 5.931 357 -2.395 2.173*** -1.117
XOM 72.530 4.362 357 -1.004 1.674*** -3.204
PSX 71.721 5.792 357 -2.940 3.688*** -1.163
CVX 82.563 8.145 357 -1.046 2.526*** -2.219
BP 28.244 3.072 357 -2.212 4.593*** -1.033
HFC 35.932 5.337 357 -1.429 1.438*** -2.250
RDS.A 43.017 4.934 357 -2.308 5.253*** -2.790
CG 16.077 3.596 357 -1.646 5.500*** -0.494
TOT 39.943 2.310 357 -2.905 1.598*** -2.730
ANDV 90.745 11.316 357 -2.119 1.396*** -2.042
WNR 39.370 7.515 357 -1.793 3.760*** -1.784
Stationarity test column headers are acronyms for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller,
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin, and Lee-Strazicich stationarity tests. The Lee-Strazicich test allows for the
presence of two structural breaks without being biased towards non-stationarity (Lee and Strazicich, 2003). D6,
D5, and D4 are RIN varieties, all other variables are stock tickers corresponding to firms as in Table 3.1.
Significance at alpha levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are reported with *, **, and ***, respectively.
4Lee and Strazicich (2003) only report critical values for tests with a sample size of 100, whereas my
sample size is 357. This will result in the test being underpowered.
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Chapter 4
Multivariate Time Series Analysis
To understand the relationship between RIN prices and refining firm values, I fit bi-
variate time series models for each RIN × Firm pair in my data. For cointegrated series,
I estimate vector error correction models (VECM), otherwise I estimate vector autore-
gressive models (VAR) in differences to account for the aforementioned non-stationarity
of my data series. Cointegration offers a systematic methodology to deal with non-
stationary data in a multivariate context. Specifically, if a pair of non-stationary series
are cointegrated, then their linear combination produces a stationary series (Engle and
Granger, 1987). After fitting the VAR and VECM models, I analyze the significance of
lagged values of RIN prices on the stock values of refining firms. Using those results, I
visualize the effect of exogenous shocks to RIN prices on refinery values using impulse
response functions.
4.1 Cointegration Tests
To select an appropriate bivariate time series model for a pair of non-stationary
series, I first need to establish whether they are cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987).
While cointegration tests are affected by structural breaks, structural breaks have lit-
tle impact on the size or power of Johansen’s cointegration test (Campos et al., 1996).
For that reason, I elect to use Johansen’s maximum eigenvalue and trace tests with-
out modification (Johansen, 1991) to evaluate the relationship between each pairwise
combination of RIN series and firms.1 Table 4.1 reports the results of these tests.
The tests for cointegration indicate that there is some cointegrating relationships
1Johansen et al. (2000) introduce a modification to the canonical cointegration test that explicitly
allows for structural breaks. Future refinements to this section may utilize that methodology.
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Table 4.1: Cointegration Tests
Maximum Eigenvalue Trace
Firm D6 D5 D4 D6 D5 D4
VLO 8.892 8.961 9.549 12.524 11.781 12.005
MPC 7.674 4.508 3.984 9.265 6.330 5.844
XOM 6.709 14.762* 19.877** 8.378 16.020 22.400**
PSX 9.901 10.607 10.719 14.258 15.047 14.014
CVX 6.628 14.909* 18.066** 8.311 16.990 20.659**
BP 3.477 3.665 4.821 5.910 5.551 6.971
HFC 15.759** 7.838 6.408 16.815 8.646 7.243
RDS.A 4.424 5.410 4.929 6.779 7.661 6.891
CG 8.016 4.898 4.721 9.941 6.399 5.901
TOT 9.546 12.623 13.839* 13.099 15.174 16.523
ANDV 10.986 8.514 8.182 13.629 10.540 9.960
WNR 6.037 3.999 3.261 6.677 4.685 3.916
Maximum eigenvalue and trace tests are Johansen’s (1991) two methodologies of testing for cointegration. D6,
D5, and D4 are RIN varieties, row names are stock tickers corresponding to firms as in Table 3.1. Significance
at alpha levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are reported with *, **, and ***, respectively.
between RIN prices and refinery stock prices. The only two significant cointegrat-
ing relationships between both the maximum eigenvalue and trace tests are biomass-
based biodiesel RINs and Exxon Mobil (XOM) and Chevron (CVX) stock prices. Both
Chevron and Exxon Mobil are large companies with market capitalizations above $100
billion and relatively high “exposure” to the RFS, as defined in Section 3.1. Chevron
lacks any refining capacity whatsoever in Alaska and PADD 2, and only 12% of Chevron’s
capacity is located there.
However, many other firms categorized as highly exposed to the RFS still lack
cointegrating relationships with RINs. HollyFrontier Corporation (HFC), whose stock
is cointegrated with D6 RINs according to the maximum eigenvalue test, is a small
company with relatively little RFS exposure.
4.2 VAR and VECM Modeling
With cointegration results in hand, I model every Firm × RIN pair using either
a reduced-form bivariate VAR model in differences (for non-cointegrated series) or a
bivariate VECM model (for series that are cointegrated at a significance level of 0.05 in
either test). Following Sims (1980), the VARs are specified in differences and have the
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following form:













where ∆FIRMt and ∆RINt are differenced values for a RIN and firm stock price at
time t respectively; ci is a regression constant for regression i ∈ {1, 2}; m is the VAR
lag length determined based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); each φli,j is
an autoregressive coefficient for the lth lag of either ∆FIRMt or ∆RINt; and ei,t is
the VAR error term for i ∈ {1, 2}. In particular, I am interested in the statistical
significance of φl1,2, the conditional effect of ∆RINt−l on ∆FIRMt, at all lags against
the null hypothesis of φl1,2 = 0. Significance of one or more lags would indicate that
there is a feedback relationship between the two series, and hence RIN price changes are
associated with subsequent firm stock price changes.
Following Johansen (1991), I use VECM models for the cointegrated series, which
are expressed as:













The VECM specification is similar to the above VAR model except for the inclu-
sion of the error correction terms (the undifferenced single-lag values of the component
series, i.e. ∆FIRMt and ∆RINt), which captures the long-run equilibrium relationship
between the two series. The error correction term allows multivariate estimation of two
series with a common stochastic trend that otherwise would cause omitted variable bias.
Significance of the error correction terms merely validates that a simple VAR model that
did not account for the series’ cointegration would be flawed. Again, for the purposes
of this research, the values of φl1,2 at all lags are the parameters whose significance is of
interest.
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These models illuminate interactions between RIN markets and firm stock prices.
Because the relationship of interest is the impact of the RFS on refining firms, the analy-
sis and results reported below will focus on the differenced RIN lag parameters and error
correction terms in the equation modeling movements in firm stock prices, i.e. the first
equations in Equations 4.1 and 4.2. Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 report parameter estimates
and significance levels for the autoregressive coefficients φl1,2, regression constants, and,
when applicable, an error correction term coefficient for 36 total regressions covering
every Firm × RIN pair.
Also reported in the aforementioned tables are observation counts (varying slightly
between models depending on lag lengths) and test statistics for three tests of model
assumptions. Included among these three are the Ljung-Box test for autocorrelation
among the residuals and the Jarque-Bera and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality of the
error term.
4.3 Results
The results from bivariate time series analysis suggest that the impacts of RIN
price movements are not homogeneous across firms. In fact, most small- and medium-
size firms values’ are not impacted by the lagged values of RIN prices. By contrast,
large firms show negative reactions to RIN price movements after a few lags. This is
especially evident in results from D5 bivariate modeling in Table 4.3, where Chevron
(CVX), British Petroleum (BP), Shell (RDS.A), and Total (TOT) all have significant
negative fourth lag terms for D5 RINs. Exxon Mobil (XOM), the only remaining large
market cap firm in the data, is also negatively associated with D5 RINs, but at the fifth
lag. This firm size pattern is not an artifact of selecting lag length by AIC; forcing all
bivariate models to include six lags does not result in any more significant fourth lag
terms in the D5 models.
Results across the D6 and D4 models are largely consistent with the D5 results,
with no significant lags among small and medium firms, and significant parameters
among most of the large firms after a few lags. In the D6 results, Shell (RDS.A),
British Petroleum (BP), and Exxon Mobil (XOM) all have negative third or fourth lag
terms, though Exxon Mobil and British Petroleum’s are only marginally significant.
Total (TOT) and Shell experience significant negative responses in the D4 models, and
Chevron (CVX) and Exxon Mobil have negative responses of similar magnitudes at the
19
Table 4.2: Bivariate Time Series Model with D6 RINs
VLO MPC XOM PSX CVX BP HFC RDS.A CG TOT ANDV WNR
Constant (c1) 0.025 -0.008 0.007 0.028 -0.001 -0.005 2.485*** -0.021 -0.011 0.001 0.010 -0.039
EC Term (π1,2) -1.558***
Lag 1 (φ11,2) -2.336 -0.662 -1.615 -1.821 -1.188 -0.864 1.681 -0.587 -0.299 -1.093 5.508 -2.566
Lag 2 (φ21,2) 2.349 -1.883 0.421 1.365 1.136 0.946 4.088* 1.122 0.682 -5.718 1.529
Lag 3 (φ31,2) 0.884 -2.156 -2.469* -4.902**
Lag 4 (φ41,2) -4.842*
N 354 354 352 354 353 353 355 353 354 354 354 354
Ljung-Box 0.002 0.002 0.064 0.000 0.111 0.108 0.001 0.148 0.012 0.015 0.008 0.000
Jarque-Bera 129.692*** 36.575*** 23.626*** 23.241*** 2.719 26.951*** 26.656*** 3.127 16.531*** 3.084 175.717*** 5.096*
Shapiro-Wilk 0.962*** 0.981*** 0.984*** 0.986*** 0.990** 0.980*** 0.981*** 0.996 0.986*** 0.995 0.964*** 0.995
Column headers are stock tickers corresponding to firms as in Table 3.1. Each column reports results from
either a VAR or VECM model as described in Equations 4.1 and 4.2. VECM models include an error correction
(EC) term (π1,2). Optimal lag order for either model is determined based on AIC. Significance at alpha levels of
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are reported with *, **, and ***, respectively.
Table 4.3: Bivariate Time Series Model with D5 RINs
VLO MPC XOM PSX CVX BP HFC RDS.A CG TOT ANDV WNR
Constant (c1) 0.025 -0.009 0.004 0.029 -0.005 -0.005 -0.019 -0.024 -0.013 0.003 0.010 -0.038
EC Term (π1,2)
Lag 1 (φ11,2) -1.417 -1.627 1.508 -2.779 1.233 0.243 0.125 1.432 0.937 -0.839 2.825 -1.970
Lag 2 (φ21,2) 0.790 -0.520 -2.788 1.340 -2.178 -2.102 -1.583 -1.205 0.713 -0.437 −2.083 0.385
Lag 3 (φ31,2) -0.411 -3.352 -0.620 -1.936 -0.766 -2.909
Lag 4 (φ41,2) -4.302 -9.040** -4.126*** -7.595*** -5.047***
Lag 5 (φ51,2) -4.705*
Lag 6 (φ61,2) 3.624
N 354 354 350 354 352 352 354 352 353 352 354 354
Ljung-Box 0.001 0 0 0 0.053 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.025 0 0.003 0.001
Jarque-Bera 129.568*** 42.073*** 24.033*** 23.747*** 1.571 20.588*** 28.044*** 0.818 14.22*** 0.475 170.158*** 5.075*
Shapiro-Wilk 0.963*** 0.98*** 0.984*** 0.986*** 0.992** 0.984*** 0.981*** 0.997 0.988*** 0.997 0.965*** 0.994
Column headers are stock tickers corresponding to firms as in Table 3.1. Each column reports results from
either a VAR or VECM model as described in Equations 4.1 and 4.2. VECM models include an error correction
(EC) term (π1,2). Optimal lag order for either model is determined based on AIC. Significance at alpha levels of
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are reported with *, **, and ***, respectively.
Table 4.4: Bivariate Time Series Model with D4 RINs
VLO MPC XOM PSX CVX BP HFC RDS.A CG TOT ANDV WNR
Constant (c1) 0.025 -0.008 1.246 0.029 1.163 -0.004 -0.019 -0.024 -0.010 0.001 0.012 -0.038
EC Term (π1,2) -0.029 -0.275
Lag 1 (φ11,2) -4.469 -2.723 -1.065 -5.874 -1.833 -0.363 -2.590 -0.580 -1.096 -1.885 2.311 -3.943
Lag 2 (φ21,2) 1.894 -1.110 3.122 3.556 -0.141 0.113 -0.444 3.335 0.688 3.720 -5.413 -0.298
Lag 3 (φ31,2) -1.157 -5.226 -3.746 -5.41**
Lag 4 (φ41,2) -3.751 -6.417 -6.528***
Lag 5 (φ51,2) -6.766
Lag 6 (φ61,2) -0.547
Lag 7 (φ71,2) 8.044*
Lag 8 (φ81,2) -7.370
Lag 9 (φ91,2) 4.175
Lag 10 (φ101,2) 10.561**
N 354 354 352 354 346 354 354 352 354 353 354 354
Ljung-Box 0 0 0.029 0 0.045 0.008 0.001 0 0.008 0.127 0.004 0.001
Jarque-Bera 131.37*** 41.336*** 23.55*** 24.843*** 1.039 32.193*** 28.844*** 0.382 22.297*** 1.773 170.472*** 5.553*
Shapiro-Wilk 0.962*** 0.98*** 0.984*** 0.986*** 0.994 0.979*** 0.981*** 0.999 0.985*** 0.996 0.965*** 0.994
Column headers are stock tickers corresponding to firms as in Table 3.1. Each column reports results from
either a VAR or VECM model as described in Equations 4.1 and 4.2. VECM models include an error correction
(EC) term (π1,2). Optimal lag order for either model is determined based on AIC. Significance at alpha levels of
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are reported with *, **, and ***, respectively.
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same lag lengths, though these are not statistically significant. Chevron’s D4 model
exhibits significant responses in the other direction at even later lags, but these are
erratic and likely spurious. Though the overlap between model results is not perfect,
it is striking that across all RIN types, there are significant negative responses at lags
three and four among large firms only. The consistency of sign and timing among these
responses suggest an underlying pattern.























































































Figure 4.1: Refinery Stock Response to a D5 RIN Shock, Selected Large Firms (Left)
and Small/Medium Firms (Right)
Figure 4.1 reports a subset of the orthogonal impulse response functions (IRFs) for
refinery stock responses to exogenous shocks in D5 RINs. Results from the shocks applied
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are in terms of the differenced stock values and are accompanied by their respective
error band. Based on the IRFs, it is clear that a shock to D5 RINs generally produces
a significant decrease in the value large refineries’ stocks (left panel of Figure 4.1).
Specifically, a unit increase in the cost of D5 RINs is associated with negative stock
price movements, hitting a minimum between 4-5 days after the shock with single-day
losses between 5 and 20 cents at that time for Chevron, Exxon Mobil, and British
Petroleum. After these significant lags, point estimates vary tightly around zero before
converging towards a long-run equilibrium. Though the economic significance of these
estimates is small (cumulative losses below a dollar for stocks worth over $40), patterns
of statistical significance are consistent. For small and medium size firms (right panel
of Figure 4.1), there is no real pattern of responses to RIN prices, convergence happens
more quickly, and error bands preclude statistical significance by a wide margin.
The fact that my most significant results come from the D5 models comport with
results reported by Lade et al. (2018), who find that advanced biofuels were the marginal
compliance fuel and that advanced biofuel firms and commodities reacted most severely
to 2013’s shocks. Use of biodiesel and advanced ethanol as marginal compliance fuels is
driven by the fact that the RFS is a nested mandate (allowing more advanced fuels to
meet conventional mandates as well) and that conventional ethanol blends are limited
by regulations on maximum ethanol concentrations, which creates the “blend wall,” the
point past which refiners cannot mix additional ethanol into most consumer fuel blends.
Some readers may question the choice of a bivariate model, given that numerous
other financial series influence the fundamental value of both RINs and refining stocks. I
offer a few brief responses to this objection. First, my data is limited, and each additional
covariate eliminates disproportionately more degrees of freedom in VAR and VECM
models. Second, the non-linear relationship between commodities and intermediate
products and RINs or firm values further complicates modeling decisions and eats away
at degrees of freedom. Third, whatever limitations the exclusion of these covariates
imposes on the interpretation of my model results are much less of a concern for the event
study modeling, which largely validates the result of the bivariate models. Nonetheless,
I do repeat my analysis including a continuous front-month future price for ethanol as
a third variable. The addition of this third variable penalizes the AIC enough that lag
selection generally does not extend to the fourth lag, but when I coerce the lag length
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to match the optimum chosen in the bivariate case, almost the exact same parameters
are significant and their signs are the same.
Before discussing the results of these models further, I conduct the event study





While multivariate time series models are suitable for characterizing everyday inter-
actions between variables, event study models effectively characterize short-run, one-off
responses to large market shocks. Regulatory changes that precipitate massive swings in
compliance credit values offer such a market shock. Event studies of compliance credit
shocks can be decomposed to study regulation’s distributional effects, as in Bushnell
et al. (2013), who counterintuitively show that stock prices of carbon-intensive firms
actually fell in response to a slump in EU carbon prices. In the context of the RFS,
Lade et al. (2018) apply event studies to 2013 shocks to examine the policy’s effect on
commodity markets and biorefining firms.
Similar to Lade et al. (2018), the specification of my event study model takes the
following form:









γs,m1(t ∈ {T+m})+Θ′∆ ln(Xt)+λMoY +λDoW +ei,t,
(5.1)
where ∆ ln(Yi,t) is the log-differenced value of a refiner i’s stock at time t; β0 is a
regression constant; the remaining βi’s are parameters on time controls of polynomial
order p; γs,m are parameters on dummies 1(t ∈ {T + m}) for the mth lag after each
event in T; s is the number of distinct events in T; Θ is a vector of parameters on
log-differenced “normal return” controls ∆ ln(Xt); λ’s are month-of-year (MoY) and
day-of-week (DoW) fixed effects; and ei,t is the disturbance.
Subjective modeling decisions were made to mirror Lade et al. (2018) as closely as
possible. Specifically, I use the same polynomial of time controls, the same fixed effects,
and the same normal return control: the RUS3000 index. My one deviation is the length
of lags I consider; given that my bivariate time series models suggested there may be
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some significant responses after the fourth lag, I set m = 6. The model is estimated on
the entire sample of firm values jointly, then separately for each bin of firms by market
capitalization.
Table 5.1: Results from Event Studies
Large Firms Medium Firms Small Firms All Firms
Event 1
Lag 0 (γ1,0) 0.004 0.013 0.009 0.008
Lag 1 (γ1,1) -0.002 -0.009 -0.010 -0.006
Lag 2 (γ1,2) 0.013 -0.012 -0.020 -0.004
Lag 3 (γ1,3) -0.003 -0.020 -0.016 -0.012
Lag 4 (γ1,4) 0.000 -0.011 -0.004 -0.004
Lag 5 (γ1,5) 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.004
Lag 6 (γ1,6) 0.011 0.000 0.005 0.006
Event 2
Lag 0 (γ2,0) 0.011 -0.006 -0.007 0.001
Lag 1 (γ2,1) -0.012 -0.001 0.006 -0.003
Lag 2 (γ2,2) -0.016 -0.003 0.000 -0.008
Lag 3 (γ2,3) 0.000 -0.017 -0.008 -0.007
Lag 4 (γ2,4) -0.032** -0.005 -0.017 -0.020
Lag 5 (γ2,5) -0.025* -0.013 0.002 -0.013
Lag 6 (γ2,6) -0.009 -0.001 -0.007 -0.006
Number of Firms 5 3 4 12
N 1780 1068 1424 4272
Each column reports selected parameter estimates and significance levels for an estimation of Equation 5.1 on a
subset of firms. See Table 3.1 to examine the firms in each size bin. Hypothesis testing is conducted using the
sample quantile test described in Gelbach et al. (2013). Significance at alpha levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are
reported with *, **, and ***, respectively.
The results from event study analysis are reported in Table 5.1. As in Lade et al.
(2018), p-values are based on sample quantile tests for significance designed to accom-
modate event studies with few firms, as discussed in Gelbach et al. (2013).1 The basic
idea behind this test is to use the empirical cdf of non-event date residuals as the distri-
bution for hypothesis testing, since event date parameters are identified off of variation
within a single day.
Patterns of statistical significance in the event studies closely mirror results from
the bivariate time series models. It is apparent that the first event does not register
for any firms in the event studies. From Figure 2.3, the first event date seems to affect
D6 RINs most dramatically. The effects on D5 and D4 RINs, however, are smaller and
1More information on the test in the context of difference-in-differences modeling is available in
Conley and Taber (2011).
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seemingly opposite to one another. If biodiesel and advanced ethanol really are the
marginal compliance fuels under the RFS, as Lade et al. (2018) reveals and my bivariate
time series results confirm, the patterns in the RINs following the first event should not
be expected to generate significant responses in firm value.
In contrast, Figure 2.3 shows that the second event has a much clearer and consis-
tently positive price impact on all RINs. As in the bivariate time series models, firms
with small and medium market capitalizations do not significantly react to the event,
and that lack of response is reflected in the pooled regression as well. But firms with
large market capitalizations do experience losses within the same time frame described
by the bivariate time series.
The general finding of both the bivariate time series models and the event study
is that large, integrated refineries lose value 3-5 days after an increase in RIN prices.
Small and medium firms exhibit no such losses, and there is no pattern of geographical




My empirical findings do not perfectly support any prevailing narrative about the
effects of the RFS. While the lack of price response among small- and medium-size firms
is in line with the conclusions of the pass-through literature, my discovery of a negative
price response among large, integrated refineries is novel and not predicted by existing
research on the RFS. Though this finding is interesting in and of itself, the reduced-form
nature of my analysis does not allow me to pinpoint any one theoretical explanation for
this result, which is the admitted limitation of this style of analysis. It is important
to note that my results do not necessarily mean that large firms are not fully passing
through RIN costs. In fact, a unique inability of larger firms to pass through RIN
costs is theoretically unfounded and seems unlikely. Below, I provide a number of other
candidate explanations.
First, it is notable that each of the large firms in my sample are also the firms with
substantial investments in assets downstream of refining. If the RFS hurts the value of
downstream assets without affecting the value of refining assets, compliance cost hikes
would only affect the firms in my sample that own both. My results could also be a
consequence of inefficient internal transfer pricing (Hirshleifer, 1956). If blending and
refining occur under two separate profit-maximizing divisions and internal transfer prices
are set inappropriately, the firm could lose profit in moving RINs from its blending to
its refining division (see Figure 1.1).
Another possibility is that larger firms simply have a harder time complying with
the RFS. Small refinery exemptions could play a role in this; the EPA is allowed to
exempt refineries for whom complying with RFS mandates would cause serious economic
hardship. Who receives these waivers is not public information (except when firms
voluntarily elect to announce it), but exemptions as a whole were at a low point in 2015.
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Moreover, because these exemptions are issued at the refinery rather than the firm level,
it is not clear that they should shield only small and medium firms from price impacts.
Larger firms could also have a harder time procuring adequate quantities of biofuels.
Biorefineries are known to be affected by diseconomies of scale in feedstock procurement
because of transportation costs (Nguyen and Prince, 1996), and notoriously expensive
biofuel transportation may generate a similar problem. At extremes, regional blend
walls could act as constraints on firm’s ability to generate RINs, creating nonlinearities
in compliance costs for firms with otherwise low marginal blending costs.
Because there are only a small number of refining firms in the US and fewer still
that I characterize as large, there is the lingering possibility that my results could be
driven by peculiarities of just a few firms. If large firms generally held the belief that
the EPA was going to reduce the mandate by more than they actually did, these firms
could have been in a RIN-short position at the time of the regulatory announcements.
Untangling these possibilities will require structural models and, in many cases,
proprietary data. Though these explanations each have their flaws, the effect that
they must jointly describe, while significant, is economically small. Even without a
full theoretical understanding of why large, integrated firms lose value while others
don’t, my results can still inform policy insofar as they thoroughly discredit the claim
that integrated refiners take advantage of merchant refiners in the RIN market. This
claim, which motivated policy proposals like transferring the point of RFS obligation




The Renewable Fuel Standard requires massive amount of biofuels to be blended
into domestic fuel supplies, and the point of obligation for that blending rests mainly
on oil refineries. A developed literature concludes that refineries are capable of passing
through the costs of purchasing RINs, but pass-through is only one potential channel
by which the RFS may affect the stock prices of obligated firms.
I use bivariate time series modeling and an established event study methodology
to measure the price response of obligated firms to RIN price movements. I find a
complete lack of price response among all firms except large companies with integrated
downstream operations. This result is both counterintuitive and unexplained by the
current RFS literature but is robust between both of my estimation techniques. The
result discredits the idea that the Renewable Fuel Standard allows integrated refiners to
reap substantial profits at the expense of merchant refiners that lack in-house blending
and retail operations. The reduced-form nature of my analyses precludes me from being
able to specify a causal mechanism, but I propose a number of potential hypotheses that
could explain these results as a starting point for future research.
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